New Stablecoin Rules Push Banks Into the Crypto Front Line

Rules governing stablecoins are taking concrete form, and the details suggest that banks and FinTechs will face a more exacting set of responsibilities than some may have anticipated.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)’s proposed rule that debuted this week under the GENIUS Act establishes a framework that links stablecoin issuance directly to reserve integrity, liquidity discipline and custodial oversight.

Market design is now becoming a matter of regulatory compliance and balance sheet management.

The proposal makes clear that stablecoins will stand or fall on the quality and management of their reserves. Requirements tied to reserve assets, liquidity and risk management indicate that structure will determine utility in the wider financial services ecosystem.

That emphasis aligns with what firms have been signaling. PYMNTS Intelligence data shows that interest in stablecoins is rising, particularly for payments, but adoption remains limited as companies wait for clearer rules and stronger ties to the banking system.

The data illustrates the gap between interest and execution. More than 40% of middle market firms have at least discussed or tested stablecoins, yet only 13% report actual usage. The read across is that companies are waiting for assurance that reserves are sound, accessible and integrated into established financial infrastructure.

Banks Absorb a New Balance Sheet Role

The proposed rule reframes stablecoins as a banking issue. It clarifies that reserves held at insured depository institutions would be insured to the issuer as corporate deposits, rather than to token holders on a pass-through basis.

This structure concentrates the claim at the issuer level even as the assets sit within the banking system. It also creates a new category of deposits that may be sizable, operationally active and sensitive to redemption cycles.

Industry participants point to a possible mismatch between control and responsibility. Marcel Thiess, CEO at Thiess Invest, told PYMNTS: “Most intraday shortfalls come from the banking side. Settlement lags, cut-off times and the bank’s own liquidity management. The issuer is not involved here.”

He added that despite this, “the framework still puts the par-value claim on the issuer,” meaning accountability remains with the issuer when customers are not made whole.

That division of roles introduces supervisory complexity. Banks manage custody and settlement infrastructure. Issuers must maintain the peg and meet redemption demands, even when disruptions originate elsewhere.

The Question of Risk Concentration

The definition of eligible reserve assets is designed to improve stability, but it may also compress risk into a narrower set of instruments.

Thiess noted that directing issuers toward the same assets has unintended effects as “narrow eligibility doesn’t eliminate risk; it just moves it. You push every large issuer into the same short-dated Treasuries and insured deposits, and you have built a stablecoin reserve system that is essentially an overlay on top of the same money market positions,” he told PYMNTS. He warned that in periods of stress, “everyone is sitting in the same trade.”

From the issuer side, the perspective is more measured. Sudeep Mehta, chief operating officer at FinTech STBL, told PYMNTS that “duration and concentration risks remain primarily with the stablecoin issuer,” adding that tighter reserve definitions can strengthen trust and reduce credit exposure when paired with disciplined risk management.

For banks, the implication is a deposit base that may behave in a correlated manner, particularly during redemption surges.

Operational Demands

The FDIC proposal introduces operational requirements that extend beyond traditional custody. Reserves must be identifiable, segregated and continuously monitored.

At scale, those requirements become complex. Thiess said: “Trust and escrow structures work well at a small scale. However, add multiple issuers, tokens and cross-chain activity in one bank, and you have an entirely different problem.”

He pointed to the need for “real-time segregation and constant eligibility monitoring” alongside intraday reconciliation between on-chain liabilities and off-chain assets.

Mehta emphasized that the issue is not feasibility but efficiency.

“Creating identifiable and segregated reserve structures at scale is realistic,” he said, but it requires “real-time reporting, standardized reserve definitions, and systems that support both auditability and liquidity efficiency.”

These requirements suggest that participation will favor institutions prepared to invest in infrastructure rather than adapt legacy processes.

Insurance Clarifies Structure but Raises Questions

The FDIC proposal clarifies that reserve deposits would be insured to the issuer, not to individual stablecoin holders.

Thiess cautioned that participants may apply familiar deposit insurance assumptions incorrectly. “The problem is that token holders can’t access an insured deposit directly. Their claim runs to the issuer,” he said, adding that when confidence breaks, “the failure risk ends up being concentrated exactly where the insurance framing made people feel most covered. That’s the part regulators, and all of us, should be worried about.”

Mehta similarly noted that insuring reserves at the issuer level “can create a perceived layer of safety, particularly for centrally-designed stablecoins, that may not fully reflect where the underlying risk sits.”

The framework resolves several structural questions, but it also introduces new points of strain. Banks must prepare for a form of deposits tied to real-time redemption expectations. Issuers must manage reserves with a level of discipline closer to regulated finance than to digital experimentation.

The next phase will not hinge on whether stablecoins can be issued, but on whether the institutions behind them can manage liquidity, operations and risk in a system where those elements are now tightly defined and continuously scrutinized.